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ABSTRACT
Academic researchers published a sophisticated model of world class logistics in 1995 and 
recently updated it with a model of 21st century logistics. Although such practices are yet to 
be perfected in the real world, it provides a yardstick for measuring logistical excellence. An 
innovative world class firm will pursue sustainable competitive advantage through well- 
integrated global supply chains. As liner operators are vital members of global supply chains, 
their contemporary strategies need particular scrutiny to identify elements of congruence or 
non-congruence. The paper discusses generic liner strategies and identifies the ideal strategy 
congruent with contemporary supply chain management practices.
INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of increasing business sophisti­
cation. The management of business functions 
has undergone radical reengineering and shifted 
more towards a system of managing processes 
rather than functions. Correspondingly, the 
management of business logistics has gained 
increasing attention in the last decade and is 
now considered a core competency of successful 
firms (Coyle, Bardi, and Langley, 1996). Such 
firms position themselves through various 
strategic choices to establish themselves as 
market leaders in the new millennium. They 
seek sustainable competitive advantage in the 
global marketplace through strategic supply
chain alliances that provide them logistical 
superiority. The supply chain alliance partners 
of these firms include their suppliers and 
suppliers’ suppliers, and customers as well as 
various transportation providers and inter­
mediaries.
As international business breaks new ground 
year after year, the management of business 
logistics will become increasingly global, complex 
and challenging. The shift towards world-wide 
manufacturing and assembling operations will 
lead to a greater role for ocean liner shipping 
companies who have provided a historically vital 
service for shippers, large and small alike. This 
is because of the increasing preponderance of
Fall 2000 55
time-based competition manifested today in 
various forms. These include the rapid adoption 
of innovative inventory management philo­
sophies, like just-in-time manufacturing, reduced 
cycle time and above all, a greater recognition of 
customer satisfaction.
While these developments are well recognized by 
all concerned, the dilemma concerning the eco­
nomic efficiency of ocean liner markets continues 
today as in the pre-containerization era. Their 
role in contemporary supply chains is beyond 
question. However, economists, policy-makers, 
and academicians perpetually debate the 
structure of liner markets and their efficiency 
outcomes. There is a continuing rift between 
shippers and carriers, and is often reported in 
trade journals (Mongeluzzo, 1999). There are 
also perceived fall-outs from the partial 
deregulation of shipping services in the U.S. 
(Bryant, 1999). The objective of this paper is to 
scrutinize contemporary ocean liner strategies 
given the much wider scope of ongoing changes 
in the management of business logistics and 
supply chain management in general. It will 
highlight areas of mutual congruity and conflict, 
and will look into a possible new order in liner 
shipping that may facilitate the establishment of 
efficient global supply chains.
THE WORLD CLASS 
LOGISTICS MODEL (1995) AND 
21st CENTURY LOGISTICS (1999)
The Michigan State Global Logistics Research 
Team released their findings on world class 
logistics in 1995 (Michigan State, 1995). The 
study, a continuation of their research on 
Leading Edge Logistics (Bowersox et al., 1989) 
and Logistics Excellence (Bowersox et al., 1992), 
led to the development of a model of World Class 
Logistics (WCL). It identified the need for simul­
taneous achievement of four key competencies— 
positioning, integration, agility and measure­
ment—for world class performance. Although the 
study did not find any firm that had perfected 
the simultaneous achievement and fusion of all 
components of the suggested model, it
established the existence of world class firms 
that had made a greater overall commitment in 
their effort towards logistical perfection 
(Michigan State, 1995).
Positioning, one of the four key competencies of 
the WCL model, refers to the selection of 
strategic and structural approaches to logistics 
operations. Integration leads to the creation of 
solid supply chain relationships. Agility is a 
firm’s competency with respect to relevancy, 
accommodation and flexibility. Measurement 
refers to the internal and external monitoring of 
results. The model identified seventeen measur­
able capabilities under each of the four key 
competencies. These capabilities of the four key 
competencies are the vehicles for seeking logis­
tical excellence. The researchers also showed 
that the seventeen identified capabilities are 
essentially the same throughout all developed 
nations and that being world class does matter 
(Michigan State, 1995).
21st Century Logistics, the most recent research 
report from the Michigan State Global Logistics 
Team, updated the WCL model and extended it 
to the broader concept of supply chain manage­
ment (Bowersox et al., 1999). It reports that the 
overall average of world class competency of 
firms did not change significantly from 1995 to 
1999 although there were significant improve­
ments in a number of the seventeen capabilities 
(Bowersox et al., 1999). The study found that 
while the positioning competency of firms 
improved, with a greater emphasis being given to 
providing a high level of service to key cus­
tomers, the decrease in several areas, including 
supply chain unification, information technology, 
information sharing, flexibility, process assess­
ment, and benchmarking, was significant. As a 
result, the new report focuses on the capabilities 
that facilitate internal and external integration. 
The attributes included in the 1995 WCL frame­
work were found insufficient for sustainable 
competitive advantage barely five years later and 
have been amended by incorporating factors that 
emphasize integrated relationships and enter­
prise extension (Bowersox et al., 1999).
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Logistics as a Core Competency
The real challenge of today’s managers is not 
merely attaining competitive superiority but 
maintaining it in the long run. This requires 
core competencies and efficient change man­
agement capabilities. A firm may not gain 
competitive advantage in the increasingly 
dynamic global marketplace through its manu­
facturing excellence alone. This is where logis­
tical competency and the efficiency of the supply 
chain alliance become critical for sustained 
competitive advantage. Such firms strive to 
make logistics management one of their core 
competencies and position themselves as leaders 
in the global marketplace. They segment their 
logistical services by providing different levels of 
service over and above their pre-existing superior 
level of basic service (Michigan State, 1995). As 
a result, they maintain multiple logistics systems 
concurrently. Through such a strategy, the firm 
can cocoon its customers and retain them. 
Customer segmentation is also advantageous 
because the most demanding customers could be 
looked upon as a source of innovation and change 
(Michigan State, 1995). Such a level of synergy 
reduces the market uncertainty of the customer 
as well as that of all channel members.
Supply chain alliances are an outgrowth of the 
core competency emphasis and the challenges of 
global competition. They are the modern coun­
terparts of vertical integration. They provide the 
benefits of joint synergy without the risk of 
ownership. The most basic requirement for alli­
ance development is that the strategic intent of 
all partners be compatible and complementary. 
Among world class firms, there is a strong 
commitment to increase leverage and reduce 
waste through supply chain alliances. The 1999 
study finds that responsiveness, flexibility, 
speed, dependability and continued sensitivity to 
cost will be the drivers of competitive advantage 
in future years (Bowersox et al., 1999).
A firm with advanced supply chain capability 
will carefully choose its transportation partners 
so as to position strategically in the global 
marketplace. Deep-sea movement of raw mater­
ials and finished goods still constitutes the most 
practical and logical way to move a good majority 
of them over long distances internationally. 
Although international shipping does not enjoy 
the privileged status of the previous era as the 
sole provider of vital transportation services, it 
remains a significant component of global supply 
chains as it did then. Liner shipping has a direct 
effect on the procurement and trading strategies 
of most firms active in the international business 
market. They play an important role in the 
simultaneous fusion of the components of the 
WCL model and the updated 21st Century 
Logistics model. As a vital member of global 
supply chains, they play a paramount role in 
facilitating world class logistical processes. 
Hence, the rationale for scrutinizing strategies of 
liner operators in the context of today’s 
sophisticated business logistics environment.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many scholars have analyzed the strategies of 
liner shipping companies. Marx (1953) provides 
a good description of the strategies of liner 
companies during the formative years that 
included industrial self-regulation through 
conference rate making and service rationali­
zation, and also their strategies to limit both 
internal and external competition. Deakin and 
Seward (1973), Evans (1977) and Ellsworth 
(1979) provided further analysis of those 
strategies in the early containerization era. 
Recent contributions in this area include those by 
Heaver (1996) and Evangelista and Morvillo 
(2000). Evangelista and Morvillo (2000) para­
phrase the competitive liner strategies under the 
traditional categories of cost leadership and 
service differentiation. They argue that carriers 
may pursue their cost leadership strategy to the 
extent of acquiring other carriers and associate 
such an initiative at the most advanced stage of 
development of shipping lines. They identify four 
levels of logistical integration. At the lowest 
level, they provide solely maritime activities and 
then progressively move on to providing port 
terminal activities, inland transport services and 
ultimately logistical services beyond transporta­
tion. Their notion of service differentiation is
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derived through the carrier’s involvement in the 
customer supply chain and is induced by demand 
fluctuations. They state that shippers’ supply 
chain strategy is changing the role of trans­
portation providers. Their empirical analysis 
establishes that service differentiation and a 
high degree of inter-firm integration are 
relatively incompatible based on the sample they 
analyzed. They caution against generalizing 
their conclusion as there are other strategic 
options open to liner firms that are significantly 
involved in movements to interior points.
Limitations of the Evangelista/
Morvillo Model
The authors acknowledge that the only models 
they analyzed were cooperative alliances. Aside 
from this, the frames of reference used by 
Evangelista and Morvillo do not convey a 
complete picture of the contemporary supply 
chain model. Their usage of the term logistical 
integration conveys an incomplete message, and 
the examples they provide barely exceed door-to- 
door transportation capability, which is only one 
subset of the logistics system. Furthermore, the 
inter-organizational integration as referred to by 
them, cannot extend beyond the lower and 
medium levels they identified with cooperative 
shipping alliances. Hence, their empirical con­
clusion that service differentiation and a high 
degree of inter-firm integration are relatively 
incompatible is only to be expected, and a fact of 
life. Furthermore, as uncovered by the 21st 
Century Logistics Study (Bowersox et ah, 1999), 
the level of integration accomplished by the top 
manufacturing businesses themselves is 
unsatisfactory. That being the case, the 
relatively low level of inter-firm integration 
between liner companies and their customers 
and/or third party logistics service providers is 
an important albeit low-priority issue and 
premature for empirical analysis. The shippers 
themselves have a long way to go with their 
intra-firm integration prior to solidifying their 
inter-firm integration. It is suggested that one 
take a broader look at all liner strategies, and 
identify those that are congruent with the 
principles of contemporary supply chain
management prior to quantifying the level of 
integration between liner operators and their 
supply chain partners.
Methodology
The study will classify contemporary liner 
strategies into three mutually non-exclusive 
categories. Each of the strategies will be 
evaluated in the context of the Michigan State 
Models of supply chain management. 
Accordingly, the paper will identify liner 
strategies that would help the end-to-end 
distribution needs of their customers and 
contribute as a partner in the global value chain.
CLASSIFICATION OF LINER STRATEGIES
For the purposes of this study, liner strategies 
will be classified into three categories, viz., inde­
pendent, cooperation and integration strategies. 
A brief description of each of the categories 
follows next.
Independent Strategy
This is an old strategy and typically used by a 
new-entrant liner operator. The increasing scale 
barriers in container shipping have impacted the 
usefulness of this strategy and with the rare 
exception of the China Shipping Group, there 
have been hardly any high profile new entrants 
in the last few years. Even among the estab­
lished traditionally independent incumbents, all 
operators, with the exception of Evergreen, have 
joined one or more co-operative alliances. 
Evergreen’s niche is its cost leadership, and 
focuses primarily on port-to-port and round-the- 
world services. It offers limited door-to-door 
services using contractual agreements. While 
Evergreen may indeed become a long-run supply 
chain partner of one or more of their customers, 
it is unlikely that their role will extend beyond 
their core competency of providing traditional 
liner services. Furthermore, an independent 
may make use of integration strategies to posi­
tion themselves as a cost-effective global carrier 
as illustrated by Evergreen’s acquisition of Lloyd 
Triestino of Italy. For these reasons, the
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independent strategy is excluded from further 
analysis although conceptually it would fit well 
with a customer’s desire to negotiate individually 
with their supply chain partners.
Cooperative Strategies
Cooperative strategies are strategies pursued by 
liner operators to bring down their costs and 
enhance their capacity utilization. These include 
conferences and consortia as well as their recent 
incarnations of discussion agreements and 
alliances, respectively. Although conference 
agreements play a significant role in the north- 
south trades in particular, their role in arterial 
trade routes that include U.S. ports has been 
curtailed drastically and replaced by discussion 
agreements (Beargie, 2000). By their nature, a 
traditional conference agreement goes against 
the principles of contemporary logistics models. 
Membership in a liner conference creates a poor 
impression among one’s customers today rather 
than being the trademark of a quality service- 
provider. It would be perceived by today’s 
shipper community as an example of the non­
customer orientation of liner operators and 
hence, not in congruence with the contemporary 
supply chain management practices. As a result, 
their demise from the major trade routes 
characterized by shippers with sophisticated 
logistical needs is understandable. By the same 
token, the flexibility of discussion agreements 
makes them relatively tolerable for those 
shippers although there is a strong likelihood of 
their coming under increasing regulatory 
scrutiny (Beargie, 2000).
Cooperative strategies help liner operators to 
utilize their resources better and reduce their 
operating costs. The British and other West 
European shipping lines have been the 
traditional proponents of asset sharing. U.S.- 
based shipping lines historically stayed away 
from such activities for maintaining their 
operational freedom. The American companies 
resorted to various in-house techniques to control 
their costs rather than entering into consortia 
and other cooperative working arrangements 
(which their competitors elsewhere did). It
became clear to them in the early 1990's that 
individual cost-control measures could only go so 
far and further savings require greater coopera­
tion. This led to a literal explosion of strategic 
alliances in liner shipping beginning in the mid- 
1990's (Fossey, 1994; Damas, 1996; and Phillips, 
1996). Operators look for the ideal partner(s) 
with whom to combine their resources in the 
most effective manner whether those are ships, 
port terminals or sailing schedules. All major 
liner routes are dominated today by one or more 
carrier alliances.
The alliances between container operators 
generally improve the service frequency and 
reduce the transit time in key port-to-port 
corridors. This is vital for shippers who demand 
more frequent services on the busier sub-trades 
as it enables them to reduce their investment in 
inventory. The extensive geographical coverage 
of an alliance provides all partners with a greater 
choice of direct port calls. Through careful 
streamlining of joint services, it is possible to 
lower port and feeder service-related costs. 
Other possibilities include the potential for 
sharing of containers, chassis, equipment and 
terminals, shared use of feeder vessels, and 
streamlining of land-based intermodal services. 
Thus, liner operators stand to gain an overall 
increase in operating efficiency and some 
monetary savings through their alliances that 
could be passed on to their customers. However, 
there are significant hurdles in the path towards 
alliance implementation, especially in the non­
shipping sector. The level of difficulty associated 
with vessel and terminal sharing is rather low 
compared to that associated with other 
implementation steps, in particular those related 
to inland operations (Kadar, 1996).
Detractors of alliances point towards the 
increasing concentration in the sector. Initial 
reaction to this strategy was that it was merely 
a marketing gimmick, loading half the ship twice 
a week rather than loading the whole ship once 
a week. After a few years of experience, the 
consequences of liner alliances appear more 
daunting. Services such as the post-Panamax 
pendulum, a combination of all major east-west
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arterial trade routes linking Asia with the U.S. 
West Coast and Europe and/or U.S. East Coast 
through the Suez Canal, are provided by the 
alliances. Such services raise strong entry 
barriers for all but the exceptionally strong 
independents (like Evergreen Lines of Taiwan). 
It has been observed that carrier alliances only 
look inward and do not focus on the needs of the 
customer or the supply chain, and lack customer- 
orientation (Berzon, 1996). Furthermore, as 
these arrangements do not truly rationalize 
excess tonnage, those carriers that embraced 
alliance-formation as the panacea for all their ills 
are likely to be disappointed. By the same token, 
the alliances will only work as long as the part­
ners maintain their comparable competitiveness 
and efficiency. There is no guarantee that this 
strategy will be anything more than a short-run 
arrangement as is well illustrated by the 
frequent shuffling of alliance partners for 
immediate operational gains. As a result, 
membership in a global alliance or a consortium 
also has limited value from a contemporary 
supply chain perspective. It is unlikely that this 
strategy would be particularly appealing to a 
customer intent on building long-lasting supply 
chain alliances.
Integration Strategies
The study will analyze vertical and horizontal 
integration strategies of liner operators as they 
have a direct relevance to the provision of global 
supply chains.
Vertical integration. Historically, it has been 
argued that it was the introduction of liner 
shipping in the early nineteenth century that 
eliminated the need for integrating merchant 
and deep-sea shipping (Casson, Barry, and 
Horner, 1986). Casson and his team studied 28 
shipping companies operating in, or controlled 
from the UK. The study found that a significant 
number of the shipping companies were involved 
in agency services, freight forwarding, steve­
doring, warehousing, providing port facilities, 
road haulage and distribution. Casson credits 
the above developments to the operational 
flexibility introduced through containerization,
and emphasizes that containerization has 
strengthened the incentive to integrate shipping 
with other modes of transportation and port 
facilities (1986).
The unitization of liner cargo by using ISO 
marine containers opened up a plethora of 
opportunities for liner operators. The use of 
large container vessels gave them the necessary 
economies of size in their deep-sea shipping 
movements without unduly prolonging the time 
spent in port. With the elimination of legal 
impediments to intermodalism, human ingenuity 
began to overcome the traditional boundaries of 
liner service that until then did not extend 
beyond the immediate vicinity of ports. Thus, 
with the arrival of the intermodal era, a new 
cycle of innovation began in liner shipping. 
Intermodal systems began to emerge and 
establish under the leadership of liner 
companies. It necessitated the coordination of 
ship arrival times with train schedules and their 
expeditious inland movement. But, the 
traditional liner feature of encouraging service 
competition made it imperative that intermodal 
capability be a competitive essential rather than 
a mere option. As cargo volumes reached a 
critical level, deep-sea liner operators began to 
take over the operations of their intermodal 
associates with the twin goals of expanding their 
area of control and reducing their costs. When 
one liner operator establishes itself as a multi­
modal entity, competing firms are compelled to 
undertake similar operations. In addition to the 
acquisition of inland transportation companies, 
other vertical integration efforts by liner 
shipping companies have included warehouse 
and distribution centers, freight forwarders, 
customs-house brokers, and EDI firms. The 
transition of liner operators into total trans­
portation entities has been referred to as one of 
the most exciting developments of the intermodal 
revolution (McKenzie, North, and Smith, 1989).
However, this strategy began to backfire in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As the intermodal 
systems of vertically integrated liner operators 
began to mature, their profitability began to 
decrease rather than increase. The reasons cited
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for this includes the excess capacity in liner 
markets and the alleged cross-subsidization of 
inland moves by the deep-sea leg. Furthermore, 
it appears that some liner operators made some 
acquisitions that were not integrated even after 
a prolonged period of gestation. They simply 
acquired channel members purely to keep up 
with their competitors, or out of grand 
expectations of creating the best vertically inte­
grated transportation structure. This led to 
significant restructuring of top liner companies 
like American President Companies, Sea-Land, 
Nedlloyd and P&OCL that began in the early 
1990's and is still continuing as illustrated by the 
recent sale of the APL stack-train services. The 
top tier liner operators are thus streamlining 
their investments and finetuning their networks.
There are fundamental concerns associated with 
the vertical integration strategies of liner 
operators. Part of this stems from the inherent 
incompatibility between the deep-sea mode and 
the land-based modes of transportation. Ship­
ping has high fixed costs and low variable costs 
while the land-based modes of transport have low 
fixed and high variable costs (Wood and Johnson, 
1995). This results in significant economic in­
compatibility when a liner operator attempts to 
run its vertically integrated operation. Further­
more, shipping companies have a very traditional 
hierarchical management structure whereas 
running an in-house integrated (liner-oriented) 
supply chain requires more of a team-based, 
horizontal management structure. Thus, this 
liner strategy, although ideally suited for 
facilitating global supply chains, is not easy to 
implement and requires a virtual catharsis of 
traditional liner management philosophy.
Horizontal integration. It was believed 
initially for many reasons that containerization 
would reinforce the conference system and its 
market power (Davies, 1990). Liners began 
horizontal integration as a means of amassing 
the huge investments required in providing an 
efficient, containerized liner service. Financial 
interests and even governmental interests have 
promoted the operational integration of container 
operators under their jurisdiction to attain
economies of scale in the environment that 
containerization spawned (UNCTAD, 1970).
Although one could conjure different variations 
of the horizontal integration theme, the only 
model considered here is a merger or acquisition 
involving liner companies. An examination of 
such activities in the liner sector shows two 
divergent trends that a recent trade journal 
categorized as the full integration type and the 
multi-brand “federal” type (Lloyd’s Shipping 
Economist, 2000). Examples of the first category 
include the creation of P&O Nedlloyd Lines, the 
NOL-APL merger and the Maersk-Sealand 
merger. All these mergers have resulted in the 
creation of a single entity that has had a 
remarkable impact on the rest of the players, 
including the disruption of the alliance 
structures in the first two cases. The “federal” 
model implies that the parent company oversees 
the activities of one or more independently 
operated autonomous subsidiaries. Separate 
brand names are maintained and run as 
individual lines as in the case of CP Ships, 
Hamburg Sud and CSAV. There is little 
empirical evidence to support the superiority of 
one model over the other. In general, this 
strategy is also designed to lower the unit cost of 
operation through gains in economies of scale 
very similar to that of the cooperative strategies 
discussed earlier. However, it provides greater 
control in the decision making process albeit at a 
heightened level of business risk. While there 
are likely to be even more defensive takeovers in 
the market, the impact of this strategy from a 
global supply chain perspective is unclear. 
However, one can conjecture that the emergence 
of a merged strong operator (such as the P& O 
Nedlloyd Lines, or the new APL brand, or 
Maersk-Sealand) with global capability is 
attractive to a shipper with sophisticated supply 
chain demands. This is especially the case when 
these operators also possess significant end-to- 
end distribution capability besides having an 
exceptionally well-positioned core competency. 
Such capabilities are irrelevant unless the 
carrier exhibits the willingness and flexibility to 
work with their customers and design tailored 
logistics packages. This would have been
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unlikely but for the introduction of recent 
regulatory changes, and are discussed briefly 
next.
CHANGES IN LINER 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The global supply chain environment underwent 
dramatic changes resulting from recent institu­
tional interventions in the liner market. Speci­
fically, the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 was 
amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 
1998 (OSRA) and partially deregulated the liner 
services in the U.S. foreign commerce. Although 
the amendments enacted are numerous, the ones 
that have a greater impact from a supply chain 
perspective are related to the introduction of 
confidential service contracts.
The service contract provision is the most 
deregulatory component of the new legislation. 
It has expanded the scope and purpose of service 
contracts from the original 1984 Act and made it 
a truly powerful marketing tool for shipping 
companies to differentiate their services from 
their competitors. The new service contract 
provision allows the co-existence of a 
discriminatory contract carriage system with the 
common carriage objectives of the tariff system. 
Although contracts need to be filed confidentially 
with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), 
except for contracts on exempt commodities, the 
previous requirement to file essential terms of a 
service contract in tariff format for public review 
is seriously curtailed. Strategic components of a 
service contract such as inland points for 
intermodal movements, freight rates, service 
commitments and liquidated damages for non­
performance can now remain confidential. 
Conferences and consortia will not have the right 
to restrict its members from negotiating 
individual contracts with shippers although they 
may issue voluntary guidelines relating to terms 
and procedures for such contracts. The voluntary 
guidelines must be submitted to the Federal 
Maritime Commission. Another significant de­
parture from the 1984 Act is that a contract may 
be based on percentage of cargo of the shipper, 
not permissible earlier because of its connotation
to a loyalty contract. Loyalty contracts are still 
illegal under OSRA. However, OSRA has altered 
the definition of such contracts to one that 
includes a deferred rebate. Individual shippers, 
shippers’ association as well as a group of 
unaffiliated shippers may enter into service 
contracts. Similarly, a group of carriers other 
than a conference is also allowed to enter into 
service contracts.
Although the new service contract provision 
allows shippers to sign confidential service 
contracts of a global nature, shippers and 
carriers have been slow to change their business 
practices because of their lack of familiarity with 
the new freedoms. An informal FMC survey 
found that 83% of 408 contracts filed by the top 
13 ocean common carriers in the U.S. foreign 
trades lacked confidentiality clauses and only 
77% of the remaining 17% required complete 
confidentiality (Beargie, 2000). Furthermore, a 
majority of the contracts are still negotiated 
during four to six weeks in early spring and 
many contracts are still confined to a single trade 
route with duration of one year or less and there 
are very few customized contracts. It is impor­
tant to note that operators such as Maersk- 
Sealand are reporting a higher than anticipated 
number of global contracts (Beargie, 2000). As 
these cargoes are typically high value items and 
account for a higher percentage based on overall 
cargo volume, it is possible that such contracts 
will lead to dedicated supply chain alliances in 
the future. Maersk Logistics (Gillis, 2000) and 
APL Logistics are two outstanding examples of 
integrated supply chain initiatives currently 
available to international shippers.
CONCLUSIONS AND 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The paper discussed developments in contem­
porary supply chain models such as the world 
class logistics (WCL) model and the 21st Century 
Logistics Model. It also scrutinized three major 
categories of generic liner operating strategies. 
All strategies have their respective pros and cons 
when viewed in the context of establishing global 
supply chain alliances. Even the much maligned
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conference strategy has the advantage of 
providing regular and reliable services at 
predictable freight rates. The most basic 
incongruity arises when shipper clients are 
unable to deal one-on-one with their liner 
shipping partners. Ideally, the vertically 
integrated independent liner operators would 
provide the best fit and be most congruent in 
supply chain alliances as they could possess 
logistical capability as well as flexibility. A 
vertically integrated liner operator who is 
capable of providing consistently reliable and 
tailored end-to-end distribution services will be 
a true asset in any world class firm’s supply 
chain. However, that strategy, attempted by a 
handful of liner operators in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's, turned out to be structurally incom­
patible with liner economics and organizational 
structure in the real world. Accordingly, this is 
not a feasible option for shippers today. The next 
best option for transportation managers is to 
seek a liner operator pursuing a horizontal
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integration strategy through mergers and/or 
acquisitions. The partial deregulation of liner 
services in the U.S. provides the right 
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